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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY 
LOVEJOY, aka THELMA 
ALLRED, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10752 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE CITY'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
The respondent Salt Lake City Corporation re-
spectfully petitions this court for rehearing in the above 
entitled action and alleges that the court in its majority 
opinion filed on July 17, 1967, erred on the following 
points: 
I. The State of Utah has not pre-empted the field 
of sexual offenses to the exclusion of city ordinances 
upon the same subject. 
1 
2. The statutes of the State of Utah do not make 
prostitution or the commission of an act of sexual inter-
course for hire a state offense. 
3. Salt Lake City does have authority to enact the 
ordinance in question. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff-respondent Salt Lake 
City Corporation prays that this action be reheard by 
this Honorable Court, and that the foregoing errors of 
the court be corrected in the interest of law, public 
order and justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
DON L. BYBEE 
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT L~KE CITY, a municipal I 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Resvondent, 
vs. Case No. 
PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY 110752 
LOVEJOY, aka THELMA 
ALLRED, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was convicted in the city and dis-
trict court of aiding and abetting in the commission of 
a crime by directing a police officer to a certain apart-
ment to obtain sexual intercourse for hire in violation 
of Section 32-2-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 




THE STATE OF UTAH HAS NOT PRE-
EMPTED THE FIELD OF SEXUAL OF-
FENSES TO THE EXCLUSION OF CITY 
ORDINANCES UPON THE SAME SUBJECT. 
The majority opinion of the court in its decision 
holds as follows on a matter which was never raised by 
the parties to this appeal: 
"We are of the opinion that the State by en-
acting comprehensive and complete laws pertain-
ing to sexual offenses has pre-empted that field." 
Such a holding is contrary to the previous deci-
sions of this court. Thus in the case of Salt Lake City 
v. Kusse, 97 U. 113, 93 P.2d 671, wherein the defend-
ant was convicted of violating a city ordinance pro-
hibiting the driving of an automobile while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, the defendant con-
tended that the state statute upon the same subject 
had application throughout the state and the city ordi-
nance was in conflict with the state statute since the 
latter provided a more stringent penalty for a second 
offense than did the city ordinance. The court in that 
case held that the grant of general police power to 
cities under then Section 15-8-84, Revised Statu,tes of 
Utah, 1933, which is identical to present Section 10-
8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cited in the court's 
opinion and respondent's original briefs, authorized 
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the city to pass an ordinance to prevent driving under 
the influence of intoxicating liquors. The court then 
held as follows respecting the right of the city to legis-
late in an area covered by state statute: 
"Does Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U. 1933, being of 
state wide application and designed to prevent 
driving anywhere in the state while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, prevent the en-
actment of an ordinance preventing in the cities 
the same thing? 
"The solution of this question depends on the 
following principles: An ordinance dealing with 
the same subject as a statute is invalid only if 
prohibited by the statute or inconsistent there-
with. (Citing several cases) . " (Emphasis added) . 
The court then concluded that in determing whether 
an ordinance is in conflict with general laws, the test 
is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which 
the statute forbids or prohibits and vice versa. 
The J(usse case clearly establishes as the law of 
this state that cities may legislate on the same subjects 
as state statutes and are precluded from doing so only 
if expressly prohibited by the statute or if the ordinance 
is inconsistent with the general law. Furthermore the 
Kusse case clearly establishes that the general grant 
of police power to cities is sufficient to support an ordi-
nance pertaining to drunk driving. Certainly the same 
rule would be applicable to Salt Lake City's ordinance 
prohibiting sexual intercourse for hire and related ,., 
offenses. If the public health, morals and welfare are 
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properly invoked in drunk driving legislation, it would 
appear inconceivable that this court should rule that 
the offering to commit or committing an act of sexual 
intercourse for hire and related offenses would not be 
included in such power. It is this very question which 
the majority of this court undertook to determine in 
its opinion but summarily discarded with the all-inclu-
sive holding that the state had pre-empted the field 
of municipal regulation of sexual offenses. As authority 
for its sweeping conclusion the court cites 37 Am. Jur. 
p. 791. A close examination of that general text reveals 
the conflict of authorities upon the express question 
involved in this case. Thus it is said at pages 792-793 
of 37 Am. Jur._, Municipal Corporations, § 166: 
"There is quite a conflict of authority as to 
the validity of municipal police ordinances en-
acted under a general welfare clause or other 
general grant of power where the offense is also 
covered by laws of the state. In many states it 
is held that under a general delegation of power 
a municipal corporation may regulate acts or 
impose penalties for acts which by the statutes 
of the state are regulated or declared to be 
crimes. The reasons underlying this view are 
that the exigencies of municipal life require 
more rigid regulation than is required in rural 
sections of the state. Clearly, many acts are far 
more injurious, and the temptation to commit 
them is much greater, in congested areas than 
in the state at large, and when done they are 
not only injurious to the public at large but 
constitute added injury to the inhabrtants of 
the local community. Therefore, the municipality 
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may exercise necessary implied authority in 
police control in imposing penal regulations con-
sistent with the Constitution and laws of a state, 
even though the act has been made a penal of-
fense by state statute." 
And in 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 165, 
p. 791, the law is stated as follows with respect to dif. 
ference of penalties between city ordinances and general 
state statutes on the same subject: 
"A municipal ordinance is not in conflict with 
a statute authorizing its adoption because of 
a difference in penalties. Thus, further and addi-
tional penalties may be imposed by ordinance 
than are imposed by statute, without creating 
inconsistency, and, conversely, at least in some 
instances lesser penalties may be imposed by the 
ordinance for violation than by the statute with-
out conflict." 
See also Annotation, 138 A.L.R. 1208, 1214. 
Clearly the State of Utah has aligned itself among 
these jurisdictions which support the foregoing general 
rules by its ruling in the K usse case. To hold otherwise 
is a clear abdication by this court of adherence to the 
rule of stare decisis. 
The K usse case is not alone in holding as it does. 
In American Fork; v. Charlier, 43 U. 231, 134 P. 739, 
this court held as follows in the area of liquor regu-
lation by cities: 
"In view of the several provisions of the stat-
utes we have quoted above, can any reasonable 
7 
doubt exist in the mind of any one that the Leg-
islature intended to and did confer ample power 
upon the municipalities of this state to pass 
ordinances prohibiting and punishing the sale 
or other disposition in any manner within the 
corporate jurisdiction of intoxicating liquors, 
and that this may be done although the statutes 
of the state likewise prohibit and punish sales 
and disposition? The overwhelming weight of 
authority in this country is to the effect that, 
where such power is conferred upon municipali-
ties, they may prohibit and punish the same acts 
that are prohibited and punished by the state 
laws, and may impose the same penalties im-
posed by the state laws, if within the jurisdiction 
of the municipal courts. 2 McQuillin, Mun. 
Corps. §§ 877, 878; 28 Cyc. 696; Black on Int. 
Liqs. § 225; 1 W. & T. Law of Int. Liqs. § 280; 
See, also, Ex parte Simmons, 4 Okl. Cr. 662, 112 
Pac. 951; same case on rehearing, 5 Okl. Cr. 
399, 115 Pac. 380, where the authorities upon 
the subject are reviewed in an exhaustive opin-
ion. To the same effect is Oklahoma City v. 
Spence (Okl. Cr.) 126 Pac. 701." 
In a concurring opinion of Justice Straup is the 
Char lier case it was also stated as follows at page 7 45 
of 134 Pacific Reporter: 
"The prohibition, regulation, or restriction of 
the sale of intoxicating liquors relates peculiarly 
to the police powers of the state. That the Legis-
lature may confer police power upon munici-
palities over subjects within the provisions of 
existing state laws is now pretty generally 
recognized. This court is committed to that 
doctrine. 'Vhere, as here, such power is con-
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ferred, the municipality may prohibit and punish 
acts which are also prohibited and punished as 
misdemeanors under a general statute of the 
state, and each may provide a separate and dif-
ferent punishment. In such case the municipality 
may prescribe and fix a fine and penalty for 
the violation of its ordinance, the same as or 
different from that prescribed and fixed by the 
statute for the violation of a statute regarding 
the same subject-matter, providing the fine or 
penalty prescribed by the municipality is with-
in the power conferred upon it to prescribe 
and fix fines and penalties. Within that limi-
tation the fine or penalty prescribed by a mu-
nicipality for the violation of its ordinance may 
be greater or less than that prescribed by the 
statute for a violation of a statute regarding 
the same subject-matter. Whether, therefore, 
the penalty prescribed by the municipality is 
authorized is not dependent upon the question 
of whether the penalty so prescribed by it is 
the same as that prescribed by the statute for 
the violation of a statute regarding the same sub-
ject-matter, but whether it is within the power 
conferred upon it to prescribe fines and fix pen-
alties. So, whether the penalty prescribed by 
the ordinance for bidding the sale of intoxicating 
liquors is the same as or different from that pre-
scribed by the statute also forbidding such sale 
is not controlling. The pertinent question is, Is 
the penalty fixed by the ordinance within the 
power conferred upon the municipality by Sec-
tion 260x87 heretofore ref erred to? I think it is.'' 
And in Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 U. 170, 106 P. 705, 
Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 189, this court held that "the Legis-
lature could confer police powers upon the munici-
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pality over subjects within the prov1Slons of existing 
state laws, and authorize it, by ordinance, to prohibit 
and punish acts which are also prohibited and punish-
able as misdemeanors under the general statutes of 
the state.'' In that case the city's ordinance regulating 
the inspection and sale of milk was upheld under the 
city's general grant of police power under the prede-
cessor to Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as well as its power to secure the general health of 
the city and to prevent the introduction of contagious 
diseases under the predecessor to present Section 10-
8-61, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
See also Thorpe v. Bamberger R. Co., 107 U. 265, 
153 P.2d 541, citing the Kusse case as the law of this 
state pertaining to the test of conflict between city 
ordinances and general laws, and City of Bellingham 
v. Schampera, Wash. 1960, 356 P.2d 292, a recent case 
which cites extensively from the Kusse decision. 
There has been no express rejection of the above 
authorities by this court. If the holding in the [( usse 
case is to be overruled it should be done expressly and 
the court should set forth its reasons for so doing. To 
overrule the long established law of this jurisdiction 
by the magic wave of the "pre-emption" wand neither 
serves the ends of orderly justice nor the preservation 
of respect for this court's deliberations. If the fore-
going cases are correct, then the court's decision in 
this case is dead wrong. If the foregoing cases are now 
to be replaced by the judicial exercise of appellate 
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judges who perceive their function to m1mm1ze local 
police power by the process of judicial legislation, then 
those responsible for such changes in the law should 
have the courage to point out wherein their predecessors 
have erred. If this criticism of the majority opinion 
seems unduly harsh, it is submitted that the under-
signed are exercising that privilege which then Chief 
Justice Henriod reserved to the citizens of this state 
in his concurring opinion in State v. Louden, 15 U.2d 
64, 387 P.2d 240, wherein he stated as follows with 
respect to his own criticism of the United States Su-
preme Court in a matter not entirely unlike that in 
this case: 
"In the nature of things I accept the decisions 
of the Supreme Court, but reserve the right, 
until bondage pre-empts it, to criticize them. I 
reserve to the citizens of my state the same privi-
lege with respect to my opinions." 
It is submitted that Section 76-53-10, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, has not pre-empted the city from 
enacting the ordinance in question in this case merely 
because it covers a wide range of acts pertaining to 
the soliciting or securing patronage for prostitution 
as well as the procuring of females for the purpose 
of prostitution. In this connection it should also be 
pointed out that the legislature in adopting said section, 
did not contemplate the same definition for prosti-
tution that the majority opinion has adopted, i.e., in-
discriminate sexual intercourse with men. Thus it is 
provided therein that "any person who procures a 
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female person for the purpose of prostitution for a 
niale person'' is guilty of a felony. Certainly such a 
provision could not be construed to require proof of 
indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men when it 
specifically relates to an act of procurement for a male 
person. A male person is most definitely singular and 
incapable of being construed in the plural sense. The 
same reasoning is applicable to another portion of 
said statute which makes it an offense for any person 
"who by any means sends, directs, takes or conveys 
any female person to any room or other place for the 
purpose of prostitution with or for another male 
person." It would appear quite beyond dispute that the 
city ordinances in question in this case prohibit the 
same conduct contemplated by the above portions of 
Section 76-53-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and, in 
view of the foregoing authorities, should be sustained 
as valid by this court. 
POINT II 
TI-IE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF 
lJTAlI DO NOT MAKE PROSTITUTION OR 
THE COM1\1ISSION OF AN ACT OF SEXUAL 
INTERCOURSE FOR HIRE A STATE OF-
FENSE. 
In the majority op1mon it is stated by Justice 
Tuckett that the decision will not hamper law enforce-
ment in dealing with vice inasmuch as police officers 
have the duty of enforcing state law as well as muni· 
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cipal ordinances. Inherent in such a statement is th<; 
clear implication that the present state laws cover the 
acts proscribed by the city ordinance which the court 
has stricken down under the pre-emption theory. Al-
though the court's ruling only applies to subsections 
7 and 8 of the city's "sexual intercourse for hire" ordi-
nance, relating to the directing of any person to any 
place for such purpose of aiding and abetting such 
a person, the court's majority opinion goes much fur-
ther by its accepted definition of "prostitution" which 
will require the city to adopt an unenforceable ordi-
nance on prostitution by reason of the impossible 
evidentiary burden that such an ordinance entails. The 
effect of this court's decision upon the remainder of 
the city ordinance relating to the offense of committing 
or offering to commit an act of sexual intercourse for 
hire is graphically illustrated by the recent extraordi-
nary writs issued by the Third Judicial District Court 
against the prosecution of such cases in the city courts. 
The concept of prostitution, houses of prostitution 
and pandering which was common in the early part of 
this century when most of our state laws pertaining 
thereto were adopted is far from adequate or realistic 
in dealing with the modern "call girl" operation under 
a referral system which dispenses sex for sale through 
extremely sophisticated and seemingly socially accept-
able channels. The expensive hotels, apartments and 
motels have replaced the bawdy houses, houses of as-
signation and houses of prostitution of yesteryear which 
were commonly known and designated as such in re-
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stricted areas often protected by public officials. The 
telephone has replaced the pimp and procurer to a large 
extent and the ingenius methods of referral of customers 
to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies has 
replaced the open solicitation from doorways and win-
dows. 
It is clear beyond any dispute that the act of 
prostitution itself and the communicable diseases which 
it necessarily generates have always been viewed by 
the legislature as matters of local concern requiring 
regulation by municipalities. That this is so is manifest-
ly evident by the complete lack of any statewide statute 
prohibiting prostitution as such or sexual intercourse 
for hire. The state statutes cited by the majority opinion 
deal with pandering, procuring for prostitution, profit-
ing from the earnings of prostitutes, etc., but none of 
such statutes makes it an offense to be a prostitute or 
perform an act of prostitution. The only statute ap-
proaching such a prohibition is Section 76-61-1 (10), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides that 
" ( e) very common prostitute, and every woman who 
from the doorways on the streets or any other place 
solicits men for immoral purposes" is a vagrant and 
punishable by imprisonment. The hazards and pitfalls 
of that statute are many. At what point does a pros-
titute become a com1non prostitute, and what constitutes 
"immoral purposes" constitutionally enforceable under 
the latter part of the definition? See State v. Musser, 
118 U. 537, 223 P.2d 193. 
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The state statutes are silent upon an act or acts 
of sexual intercourse for hire. There is no state statute 
under which such an act can be prosecuted. 
It follows from the foregoing that the self-serving 
statement of the majority opinion that its holding will 
not hamper law enforcement in dealing with vice is 
clearly misleading and calculated to allay the fears of 
public officials and the public at large that the decision 
erodes the power of municipalities to effectively control 
prostitution. It certainly does not take any great power 
of discernment to recognize that prosecutions for pros-
titution under the requirements laid down by this court 
will fall drastically and perhaps entirely by reason of 
this decision. That the legislature may correct such an 
obvious unintended judicial result will be of little 
comfort to the law abiding citizens and families of this 
state who must accept "sex for hire" as a lawful pursuit 
on a statewide basis until that time arrives. 
POINT III 
SALT LAKE CITY DOES HAVE AUTHOR-
ITY TO EN ACT THE ORDINANCE IN QUES-
TION. 
The respondent incorporates herein the argument 
set forth under Point I with respect to the power of 
the city under Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, to enact the ordinance in question. This general 
grant of police power to cities authorizes them to "zxiss 
all ordinances arul rules, and make all regulations, not 
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repugnant to law, * * * cu are necessary and proper 
to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and 
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the 
inhabitants thereof * * *." 
In addition to the many Utah cases cited in the 
respondent's supplemental brief in which the above 
statute has been held to authorize ordinances relating 
to the preservation of health and protection of public 
morals, the court is asked to consider the following 
from 42 Am. Jur., Prostitutes, § 2: 
"The management of those vocations which 
minister to and feed upon human weaknesses, 
appetites and passions comes directly within the 
scope of what is known as the police power." 
As authority for the above, the text cites the case of 
L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 20 S. Ct. 788, 
44 L.Ed. 899, in which the Supreme Court of the United 
States upheld the power of the city to establish districts 
within which prostitutes could live as against the claim 
of constitutional deprivation of property by affected 
landowners. In so holding the United States Supreme 
Court declared: 
"In this respect we premise by saying that 
one of the difficult social problems of the day is 
what shall be done in respect to those vocations 
which minister to and feed upon human weak-
nesses. appetites and passions. The management 
of these 1•ocations comes directly within the scope 
of what is known as the police power. They 
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affect directly the public health and morals. 
'.l'hei.r management be~omes a matter of grow-
mg importance, especially in our larger cities, 
where from the very density of population the 
things which minister to vice tend to increase 
and multiply. It has been often said that the 
police power was not by the Federal Constitu-
tion transferred to the nation, but was reserved 
to the states, and that upon them rests the duty 
of so exercising it as to protect the public health 
and morals. While, of course, that power cannot 
be exercised by the states in any way to infringe 
upon the powers expressly granted to Congress, 
yet until there is some invasion of congressional 
power or of private rights secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States, the action of the 
states in this respect is beyond question in the 
courts of the nation." (Emphasis added). 
Can there be any question that those who engage 
in sexual intercourse for hire are not involved in a voca-
tion which directly affects the public health and morals? 
It would appear too clear for argument that the spread 
of loathsome venereal diseases can in large measure "be 
attributed to prostitution and sex acts for hire. The 
prohibition against the commission of an act. of sexual 
intercourse for hire has the beneficial double effect of 
preventing both prostitution as this court has defined 
it and the spread of communicable disease. With respect 
to the latter, Section 10-8-61, Utah Code A.nnotated, 
1953, also expressly authorizes cities to secure the gen-
eral health of the city and prevent the introduction of 
contagious diseases into the city. 
In the addition to the foregoing, Section 10-8-41, 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, authorizes cities to sup-
press or prohibit the keeping of disorderly houses among 
other things, and Section 10-8-47, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, provides that cities "may prevent * * * all 
disorderly conduct * * *." Justice Ellett in his dis-
senting opinion has indicated that there is no better way 
to prohibit the keeping of disorderly houses than by 
drying up the source of revenue upon which they feed. 
At common law a "disorderly house" is one in which 
people resort to the disturbance of the neighborhood 
or for purposes which are injurious to the public morals, 
health, convenience or safety. See Martin v. State, 
62 Ga. App. 902, 10 S.E.2d 254, 255; City of Ottumwa 
v. Stickel, 195 Iowa 988, 191 N.W. 797. And in City 
nf St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d 
902, certiorari denied 365 U.S. 815, 5 L.Ed.2d 693, 
it was held that "disorderly conduct" embraces acts 
which corrupt the public morals or outrage the sense 
of public decency. Does not the sale of sexual acts 
come within the above definitions? In addition to the 
authorities that we have heretofore cited with respect 
to the city's powers to preserve the public health and 
morals, it is submitted that the grant of power contained 
in said Sections 10-8-41 and 10-8-47 authorizes the ordi-
nance here in question. It is further submitted that 
the majority opinion was in error in stating that said 
Section 10-8-41 dealt only with prostitution thus sup-
porting its conclusion that the ordinance in question 
went beyond the power of cities to suppress prostitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
The majority opinion in this case is diametrically 
opposed to the previous decisions of this court and the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The pre-emption 
theory of the court was never advanced by the parties 
to this litigation and is clearly contrary to the estab-
lished law of this state. The court should carefully 
review this aspect of the case and, hopefully, discard 
it in order that a proper decision can be rendered by 
the court upon the question of the respondent's statu-
tory power to enact the ordinance in question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
DON L. BYBEE 
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
19 
